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UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY AsS'N:
THE CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT,
LIBRARY FILTERING, AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLES
By Felix Wu

The explosive growth of the Internet over the last decade has revolutionized communications, greatly expanding the potential audience for any
one message and the messages available to any one person. There is more
of every kind of communication, from personal correspondence to commercial transactions, and from political commentary to pornography. It is
the ready availability of pornography on the Internet that has troubled
many in the United States, some of whom claim that such material threatens to undermine the development of the Internet as a whole. 1 In particular, there is substantial concern that the future of the Internet as an educational tool for children depends on being able to prevent children from
seeking out or stumbling upon pornographic material.2
Congress initially responded to this concern by regulating the Internet
directly, attempting to ban the transmission of indecent material to minors.3 However, the Supreme Court has all but stated that such efforts are
doomed to failure, because any attempt to restrict minors' access to speech
will impermissibly restrict adults' access to the same speech.4 The Court
© 2004 Berkeley Technology Law Journal & Berkeley Center for Law and Technology.

l. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) ("The Government apparently assumes that the unregulated availability of ' indecent' and 'patently offensive' material on the Internet is driving countless citizens away from the medium because of the
risk of exposing themselves or their children to harmful material.").
2. See YOUTH , PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 19-20 (Dick Thornburgh &
Herbert S. Lin eds., 2002) ("Success in dealing with [concerns about pornography] is
arguably a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for fully exploiting the social and educational potential of the Internet for children."), available at http://bob.nap.edu/html/
youth_internet/.
3. See Child Online Protection Act (COPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681736 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)); Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA), Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, 133-36 (codified as amended at 4 7
u.s.c. § 223 (2000)).
4. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down CDA § 502 except as
applied to child pornography); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (raising
questions about the constitutionality of COPA); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir.
2003) (affirming the grant ofa preliminary injunction against COPA), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 399 (2003).

556

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:555

has suggested that a better approach might be to allow individuals to filter
the content they receive at home, so that adults can decide for themselves
how to control what they and their children see. 5
Congress' latest attempt to protect children from pornography takes up
the idea of filters, but moves it from the home to public libraries and
schools, raising First Amendment questions in the process. The Children's
Internet Protection Act (CIPA) requires that libraries enable filters on all
Internet-accessible computers in order to receive federal subsidies for
Internet access and related computer equipment.6 In United States v.
American Library Ass 'n ("ALA If'), a highly fractured Supreme Court
held that the Act does not violate the First Amendment because libraries
have the discretion to provide only filtered Internet access and Congress
has the discretion to refuse subsidies to libraries with unfiltered access. 7
The constitutionality of CIPA hinges primarily on the level of scrutiny
a court should apply to the Act. This question in tum implicates a host of
First Amendment doctrines, including public forum doctrine, editorial discretion cases, the selection-removal distinction, and prior restraint doctrine. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never laid out a consistent
framework for dealing with these different doctrines, and as a result, the
many opinions in this case talk past each other, each using a different doctrinal framework without explaining why one framework should be preferred over another.
Reconciling the competing doctrines and cases is possible if one understands that to choose among them is to make judgments about the social roles of various institutions. To say that the public forum doctrine
does or does not apply to this case is to say something about the role of
libraries, the nature of the Internet, and the place for federal subsidies to
libraries. Framing the debate in this way clarifies the real differences in a
way that First Amendment doctrines standing alone do not. More importantly, by focusing on institutions, courts have a way of grounding the inevitably normative judgments that these doctrines invite. Whether or not
library Internet access is a public forum depends on how one characterizes
such access. In the absence of constraints on this characterization, courts
remain free to choose whatever characterization justifies the ultimate re5. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877.
6. Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763A-335 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2000) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)
(2000)). The Act also requires the filtering of Internet content on public school computers, but this provision was not at issue in this case and will not be analyzed in this
Note.
7. 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003) [hereinafter ALA II] .
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sult they reach. The characterization of library Internet access should depend, however, on the characterization of libraries and the characterization
of the Internet. The histories and social roles of these institutions limit the
universe of plausible characterizations of library Internet access.
In particular, in the case of government restrictions on public spaces or
public subsidies, there are at least two distinct institutions that matter: the
8
government entity making the restriction and the space being restricted.
Whether the entity can restrict the space consistent with the First Amendment should depend on the level and type of discretion entrusted to it as an
institution, and on the openness of the space, as an institution, to public
discourse. Courts often use one or both of these factors, but they rarely do
so explicitly, leading to gaps in their analysis. Thus, the plurality in ALA II
fixates on the need to continue to defer to libraries' book selection decisions, even though such deference is ambiguous at best in defining the role
of libraries and potentially inapplicable in the context of the Internet. An
explicit analysis of institutions suggests that the evolution of librarians
from gatekeepers to information managers and the interactive nature of the
Internet together require that library filtering be subject to strict scrutiny.
Similarly, the role of the federal government in libraries and the federal
interest in using subsidies to promote widespread Internet access together
suggest that the decision to mandate filters as part of a federal funding
program is also subject to strict scrutiny. Because the Act cannot pass
strict scrutiny, the Court erred in upholding it.
Part I describes the treatment of pornography under the First Amendment, explains why filtering technology poses First Amendment problems,
and sets out the doctrines that courts have applied to these problems. Part
II fits the ALA II opinions into this First Amendment framework. Finally,
Part III explores the importance of the social roles of institutions to the
application of First Amendment doctrines, examining the roles of libraries,
of Internet access, and of federal funding for libraries and Internet access.

I.

BACKGROUND

To understand ALA II, one must understand not only the Act in question, but also the reasons why filtering pornography tends to raise First
8. Throughout this Note, "space" refers to both physical spaces and the nonphysical "spaces" created by funding programs. One can conceive of those who receive funding as having been admitted into the space created by the program. See Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,830 (1995) ("The [fund] is a forum
more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are
applicable."); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985) (applying public forum doctrine to a charity drive aimed at federal employees).
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Amendment issues and the tools courts have used to deal with similar issues in the past.
A.

Children's Internet Protection Act

CIPA requires that a library may only receive funds under two programs designed to subsidize the cost of Internet access and associated
computer equipment if
(A) such library(i) has in place a policy of Internet safety for minors that includes the operation of a technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers with Internet access that protects
against access through such computers to visual depictions that
are obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors; and
(ii) is enforcing the operation of such technology protection
measure during any use of such computers by minors; and
(B) such library(i) has in place a policy of Internet safety that includes the operation of a technology protection measure with respect to any of its
computers with Internet access that protects against access
through such computers to visual depictions that are obscene or
child pornography; and
(ii) is enforcing the operation of such technology protection
measure during any use of such computers. 9

Libraries "may disable a technology protection measure ... to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purposes." 10 One program restricts such disabling to "use by an adult. " 11
B.

Pornographic Content and Filtering Technology

Not all content that might be considered pornographic receives the
same treatment under the First Amendment. Two types of pornography
can be banned outright: obscenity 12 and child pornography. 13 The First
9. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(l) (restricting grants under the Library Services and Technology Act); see also 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(8)-(C) (placing similar restrictions on discounts under the E-rate program).
10. 20 u.s.c. § 9134(f)(3).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(P).
12. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining the test for obscenity).
Material is obscene if:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
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Amendment protects pornography that does not fall into one of these two
categories, and governments cannot restrict adult access to such material. 14
Much of this material is considered "harmful to minors," however, and
access by minors can be restricted. 15 Ostensibly, the goal of CIPA is to
restrict all access to obscenity and child pornography and to restrict minors' access to material harmful to minors. 16
If it were possible to filter out only material in these three categories
(two for adults), filtering would pose no constitutional issue; the problem
is that no filter can block precisely the content that fits into one of the legal categories. 17 The predominant form of filtering technology in use today consists of software that compares each request for a Web page
against a precompiled control list of pages. 18 The control list is generally
divided into categories of potentially objectionable content, one or more of
which usually deals with sexual content. 19 If a given category has been
selected, the software will block all requests for Web pages within that
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether ... the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Id.
13. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (finding that for child pornography, the Miller test should be adjusted such that "[a] trier of fact need not find that the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue
need not be considered as a whole").
14. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (invalidating a ban
on "virtual" child pornography- material produced using adults, but made to look like
child pornography); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) ("[T]he Government may
not 'reduce the adult population [to consuming] only what is fit for children."') (quoting
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996)) (brackets
added).
15. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
16. See 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(l) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(8)-(C).
17. The focus here is on the technological limits of filters, but even if filters were
technologically perfect, uncertainty about the application of the Miller test would still
lead to filtering errors. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 164-65 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the result) ("Thus, it is clear that as long as the Miller test remains in effect
' one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this
Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so."') ( quoting Paris
Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
18. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 , 428 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
[hereinafter ALA I]. See generally Richard J. Peltz, Use "The Filter You Were Born
With": The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons of
Public Libraries, 77 WASH. L. REv. 397, 404- 16 (2002) (discussing the technology and
limits of filtering).
19. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 428.
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category. While each software company compiles its control list somewhat
differently (and keeps secret its process for doing so),20 the basic idea is
that the company first searches the Web to find the universe of Web pages,
much as a search engine might do, then uses automated techniques to try
to focus on potentially objectionable pages, and then employs some human review of the content on these pages. 21 Companies do not generally
re-review pages on a systematic basis. 22
This process inevitably leads to both underblocking, the omission of
objectionable pages from the control list, and overblocking, the inclusion
of unobjectionable pages on the control list.23 Underblocking happens because no search can find every Web page, pages are constantly being
added, and automated screening cannot detect pages with objectionable
pictures but no text. 24 Overblocking happens because the automated
screening is very imprecise, and the subsequent human review is either not
comprehensive or prone to error.25 Furthermore, overblocking and underblocking occur when Web page content changes from objectionable to unobjectionable, or vice versa, between when the control lists are compiled
and when they are used.26 Given the technological limitations, any filtering system that blocks enough unprotected content to be considered an
effective technology protection measure will also block a substantial
amount of protected content. 27
Because of the substantial overblocking, courts would likely hold that
banning outright all material blocked by any given software filter would
be overbroad and hence a violation of the First Amendment.28 The question in this case is whether a public library's use of the same filter violates
the First Amendment, and if not, whether Congress can require such filtering as a condition of federal funding.
C.

Library Filtering and First Amendment Doctrines

Before ALA I, the only case to address the constitutionality of library
Internet filtering was Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the

20. Id. at 430.
21. Id. at 430-33.
22. Id. at 435-36.
23. /d. at436-37.
24. Id. at 431-32.
25. Id. at 432-35.
26. Id. at 435-36.
27. Id. at 450.
28. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-79 ( 1997) (finding the coverage of the
CDA to be overbroad).
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Loudoun County Library. 29 In Loudoun, members of the local community
challenged the library board' s decision to install filters on all library computers. In finding the library's policy unconstitutional, the district court
held that library Internet filtering was: (1) a content-based restriction in a
limited public forum; 30 (2) not simply an exercise of the library's discretion in selecting materials for its collection;31 (3) a content-based removal
decision; 32 and (4) a prior restraint. 33 For all of these reasons, the court
applied strict scrutiny. 34 Finding "many less restrictive means available,"
including the possibility of only filtering children's access, the court invalidated the library policy. 35 The three-judge district court panel36 in ALA
I used similar reasoning to reach the same conclusion that library Internet
filtering is unconstitutional, and thus found CIPA unconstitutional. 37 Each
of these lines of First Amendment doctrine, as well as their application in
Loudoun and ALA /, will be examined below.
I.

Public Forum Doctrine

Public forum doctrine captures the idea that the more a government
venue is open to speech and sReakers, the less control the government has
over speech within the venue. 8 Courts have devided such venues into four
categories: traditional public forums, limited public forums, nonpublic forums, and nonforums. Traditional public forums are places such as streets
and parks that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques29. 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) [hereinafter Loudoun II] (granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment); 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998) [hereinafter Loudoun
/] (denying defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment).
30. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
31 . Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94.
32. Id. at 794-95.
33. Id. at 797.
34. Under strict scrutiny, "[a] content-based limitation on speech will be upheld
only where the state demonstrates that the limitation 'is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp.
2d at 564 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
( 1983)). Part of this test involves determining whether the limitation is the "least restrictive means" to achieve those interests. Id. at 566.
35. Id. at 566-67.
36. CIPA stipulates that challenges to its constitutionality will be heard by a threejudge district court panel and provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of any
decision holding the act unconstitutional. See CIPA, Pub. L. No. I 06-554, § 1741, 114
Stat. 2763A-335, -351 to -352 (2000).
37. See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
38. See Perry Educ. Ass' n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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communicating information, libraries were open to the public generally,
and the nature of libraries was compatible with communicative activity.49
All three factors suggested that the government had designed libraries to
provide the widest possible access to the written word. 50
The Loudoun court cited Kreimer and used the same factors to find
that the library, considered as a whole, is a limited public forum.51 The
ALA I court noted that the access sought in the case defined the relevant
forum, so that in this case, it was library Internet access, and not the access
to library as a whole or the library' s book collection, that defined the relevant forum. 52 The court also distinguished between content restrictions
that define the boundaries of a limited public forum, and content restrictions within a limited public forum, noting that the former is subject to
more lenient review.53 Finding that filtering removes content from what is
otherwise a relatively broad forum, the court held that Internet filtering did
not simply define the boundaries of a limited forum and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 54
2.

Editorial Discretion

An important class of cases that courts have held to lie outside the
public forum doctrine is those in which the government legitimately exercises some form of editorial discretion. Thus, in Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes,55 the Court held that public television
stations have wide latitude in deciding which programs to air, and in Na56
tional Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Court held that the NEA has
wide latitude in deciding which proposals to fund. Courts have almost
universally suggested that libraries have the same discretion in deciding
which books to acquire. 57 The ALA I court, however, held that such discretion did not apply to decisions about Internet filtering, reasoning that dis-

49. Id.
50. Id.
5 1. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 563 (E.D. Va. 1998).
52. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 , 455-56 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
53. Id. at 457.
54. Id. at 46 1.
55. 523 U.S. 666 (I 998).
56. 524 U.S. 569 (I 998).
57. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 ( 1982) ("Petitioners rightly
possess significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries."); ALA I,
201 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (" [W]e agree . .. that generally the First Amendment subjects
libraries' content-based decisions about which print materials to acquire for their collections to only rational review.").
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tions. " 39 Such forums cannot be closed, and any content-based restrictions
within them are subject to strict scrutiny.40
Limited or designated public forums are venues the government sets
aside for expressive activity, often for a particular purpose and possibly
for a particular set of participants. Examples include fiublic university
meeting spaces available to registered student groups, 1 and municipal
theaters available for arts productions.42 Such forums can be closed, and
the government has some leeway in defining the boundaries of the forum,
but otherwise, content-based restrictions are still subject to strict scrutiny.43
Nonpublic forums are venues in which communicative activity occurs,
but which the government has not oeened for such activity; one example is
a public school teacher's mailbox. In nonpublic forums, content-based
restrictions need only be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.',45 Finally,
non-forums are venues not designed for public discourse of any sort. In
such spaces, the government can eliminate speech altogether or use the
venue to promote its own views without providing an opportunity to respond. 46
Thus, to determine whether to apply strict scrutiny, one issue courts
need to consider is whether the relevant venue is a limited public forum. In
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, the court determined that a library is a limited public forum, in the course of deciding whether the libr3!1' could exclude a homeless man for violating its patron conduct rules.4 The court
cited three factors relevant to this determination: government intent, extent
of use, and the nature of the forum. 48 In assessing these factors, the court
noted that the government established libraries for the express purpose of
39. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
40. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
41. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
42. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
43. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
44. Id. at 46-47.
45. Id. at 46.
46. Courts generally do not use the label "non-forums" in the context of public forum doctrine. Rather, courts often speak about "whether public forum principles apply to
the case at all." See Ark. Educ. Television Comm' n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672 (1998).
When venues are found to be non-forums, that is, outside the other forum categories,
courts allow the venue to "facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead of others."
Id. at 674.
47. 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
48. Id. at 1259-62.
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cretion only applied to judgments that singled out speech of particular
value, rather than those that excluded disfavored speech. 58

3.

The Selection-Removal Distinction

In making this distinction, the ALA I court joined the Loudoun court in
distinguishing between a library's selection decisions and its removal decisions. This distinction originated in the case of Board of Education v.
Pico. 59 In Pico, a local school board removed books from a public high
school library that it felt were "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti[Semitic], and just plain filthy.',6° Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, held that although schools had substantial discretion to determine the
content of their libraries, they could not exercise that discretion "in a narrowly partisan or political manner," and that books could be removed
based on their "educational suitability," but not based on their ideas. 61 Justice Brennan further noted that his opinion was limited to the removal of
books, and not their acquisition,62 a distinction that drew fire from Justice
Rehnquist,63 and that has been the subject of much commentary, particularly in the library filtering context. 64
The Loudoun court applied the distinction and determined that Internet
filtering was a removal decision, not a selection decision.65 The court
found that the Internet is an integrated whole and that in deciding to purchase Internet access, "each Loudoun libra~ has made all Internet publications instantly accessible to its patrons." 6 A single purchase provided
complete access, and the library need not spend additional funds to access
58. 201 F. Supp. 2d at 462-66.
59. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
60. Id. at 857.
61. Id. at 870-71.
62. Id. at 871 - 72.
63. Id. at 916 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]his distinction between acquisition and
removal makes little sense. The failure of a library to acquire a book denies access to its
contents just as effectively as does the removal of the book from the library's shelf.").
64. See Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment: Ruminations on
Public Libraries' Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191, 215-16
(2001) (arguing that filtering is a removal decision); Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What
Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1117, 1122-27 (2000) (suggesting
that only viewpoint neutrality is required in both selection and removal decisions); Peltz,
supra note 18, at 468-75 (distinguishing filtering from book selection, regardless of
whether an abstract selection-removal distinction can be made); David F. Norden, Note,
Filtering Out Protection: The Law, the Library, and Our Legacies, 53 CASE W. R ES. L.
REV. 767, 786-89 (2003) (arguing that filtering is a selection decision).
65. Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 1998).
66. Id. at 793.
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any particular Web page; in fact, the library had to spend additional funds
in order to block Web pages. 67
After the Loudoun decision, Mark Nadel criticized the idea that resource constraints would only push libraries to offer more Internet content
and not less.68 Nadel noted that time on Internet-accessible computers is
often a scarce resource and that libraries should have the same discretion
in deciding how to fill that time as they do in deciding how to fill their
shelves. 69 The ALA I court quoted Nadel on this point approvingly,70 but
nevertheless found that Internet filtering is a removal decision, noting that
filters make an affirmative judgment about what content to exclude, rather
71
than an affirmative judgment about what content to allow.

4.

Prior Restraint Doctrine

Prior restraint doctrine places a strong presumption of unconstitutionality on any government attempt to prevent speech beforehand, rather than
sanctioning it after the fact. The theory is that such prior restraints have a
"chilling effect,"72 potentially deterring speech that would be found lawful
after a full judicial review. One result of this doctrine is that an otherwise
impermissible ban on speech is generally still impermissible even if
speakers are given the opportunity to petition to circumvent the ban.
In the Internet filtering context, courts have invoked prior restraint
doctrine to hold that if filtering is impermissible, it remains so even if library patrons have the opportunity to request that individual pages be unblocked. 73 Often cited is Lamont v. Postmaster General, in which the
Court struck down a provision requiring the postal service to separate out
"communist political propaganda," and deliver it only on request. 74 Citing
Lamont, both the Loudoun court and the ALA I court held that the library's
unblocking policy did not cure any constitutional defects in the filtering
policy, even if library staff had no discretion in deciding whether to fulfill
a patron's request. 75

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Nadel, supra note 64, at 1128-29.
Id.
ALA I , 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,465 n.25 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Id. at 464-65.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486; Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
381 U.S. 30 1 ( 1943).
ALA I , 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486; Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
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THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

In ALA II, most of the members of the Court analyzed the constitutionality of CIPA in two parts. First, as an exercise of Congress' spending
power, CIPA would be unconstitutional under South Dakota v. Dole76 if it
required states to violate the Constitution. 77 This inquiry is equivalent to
asking whether libraries infringe the First Amendment rights of their patrons by installing filters, independently of CIPA. Second, CIPA would be
unconstitutional if it conditioned federal funding on the surrender of First
Amendment rights.78 Whether libraries have First Amendment rights to
surrender, or whether they can assert the rights of their patrons, is unclear,
but while the plurality expressed some doubt about the existence of such
rights, it ultimately assumed that the rights do exist. 79 This second inquiry
then amounts to asking whether, even if a library could constitutionally
filter Internet access, Congress can constitutionally require libraries to do
so.

A.

The Constitutionality of Library Filtering

Seven members of the Court held that libraries could constitutionally
implement a filtering program under CIPA, though only four could agree
on a rationale. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, held that
public forum doctrine was inapplicable to the case because "[a] public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order to create a public forum
for Web publishers to express themselves, any more than it collects books
in order to provide a public forum for the authors of books to speak."80
Justice Rehnquist held instead that as in Forbes and Finley, libraries have
the right and responsibility to make discretionary judgments about the material provided to patrons, and that this judgment is subject to lenient judicial review.81 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist rejected any distinction between selection and removal, holding that a library's decision to employ a
filter was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. 82 Finally, Justice
Rehnquist suggested that there was no prior restraint problem, writing that
"the Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a
public library without any risk of embarrassment."83
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

483 U.S. 203 (1987).
ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (2003).
Id. at 2307.
Id.
Id. at 2305.
Id. at 2304.
Id. at 2306.
Id. at 2307.

2004]

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS'N

S67

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that a selection-removal distinction was defensible and should have been applied
in this case. Justice Souter characterized the deference given to selection
decisions as being administrative in nature, based in the difficulty of judicially reviewing the numerous resource-constrained decisions librarians
make.84 Justice Souter acknowledged that resources to provide Internet
access might also be limited, but suggested that these limitations did not
justify filtering. 85 Hence, Justice Souter argued that strict scrutiny applied
to a library's decision to filter. 86 Filtering failed strict scrutiny, according
to Justice Souter, because restricting only children to filtered access is a
less restrictive means of achieving the interest in protecting children. 87
The remaining three members of the Court focused in one way or another on the unblocking provisions of CIPA. Justice Kennedy, citing no
case law, argued that the need to request that pages be unblocked was not
a constitutional burden of "any significant degree."88 Justice Breyer argued for the novel proposition that the selection-removal debate should be
resolved by applying intermediate scrutiny.89 Under intermediate scrutiny,
Justice Breyer found that the unblocking provisions ensured a reasonable
fit between the filtering policy and the government's interest in protecting
children. 90 Justice Stevens argued that library filtering was constitutional,
despite characterizing CIPA as a prior restraint.91 For Justice Stevens, this
characterization of CIPA indicated not that library Internet filtering was
unconstitutional, but that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require
such filtering. 92

B.

The Constitutionality of Congress' Funding Condition

The plurality and Justice Stevens agreed that filtering was constitutional, and each went on to consider whether CIPA might nevertheless be
unconstitutional. In dividing on this question, the two opinions took very
different approaches to resolving two leading cases in the area: Rust v.
Su/livan93 and Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez.94 In Rust, the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
9 I.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2321 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 23 I 3 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
Id.
500 U.S. 173 (1991 ).
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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Court upheld a restriction preventing doctors receiving funding under a
specific program from engaging in abortion counseling, while in Velazquez, the Court struck down a restriction preventing lawyers receiving
funding under a specific program from challenging welfare laws. In upholding CIPA, Justice Rehnquist cited Rust for the general proposition that
the government is allowed to dictate how its money will be spent, and distinguished Velazquez as a case in which the speech being funded was inherently anti-government. 95 In voting to strike down CIPA, Justice Stevens cited Velazquez for the general proposition that the government is not
allowed to distort the usual functioning of a medium of expression, and
distinguished Rust as a case in which the government used private actors
to convey its own viewpoint.96

III.

ANALYSIS

What is most striking about the opinions in this case is that they demonstrate that the Court lacks a broad framework within which to understand the different First Amendment doctrines that might apply. Thus, the
district court relied primarily on public forum doctrine,97 but the plurality
in the Supreme Court found such reliance "out of place in the context of
this case," invoking instead the cases on editorial discretion. 98 On the
other hand, Justice Souter's dissent relied on Pico, unmentioned by the
plurality, while not addressing Forbes and Finley, and e~ressing no view
on whether public forum principles applied to the case. The other three
opinions proposed entirely different approaches to the problem, largely
without explaining why they rejected the application of other doctrines. 100
A satisfactory reconciliation of these different doctrines and lines of
cases requires a broader First Amendment framework in order to understand what factors are relevant when applying the doctrines to any given
case. Without such a framework, the Court's opinions seem ad hoc, convincing only to those who share the same underlying assumptions. Exposing these assumptions at least clarifies any essential differences, and ideally also makes possible other arguments for reaching a particular conclusion m a case.

95. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2307-08.
96. Id. at2316-17.
91. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 454-70 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
98. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
99. See id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 2309-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2310-12
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2312-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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This Note suggests that in the context of restrictions on government
spaces, courts should analyze two different institutional roles- that of the
government entity making the restriction and that of the space being restricted- in order to apply First Amendment doctrines to the restriction. In
analyzing the government entity, courts should consider whether the proposed restriction is consistent with the level and type of discretion entrusted to that entity. In analyzing the government space, courts should
consider whether the restriction is consistent with the features and degree
of openness of the space. In both cases, the question is whether the restriction comports with the social role played by the various institutions. Neither government entities nor government spaces exist in a vacuum; courts
should look to the history of such entities and spaces, as well as their interaction with other institutions, in order to decide whether their nature
supports or undermines the proposed restriction.
Many commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court's current
First Amendment jurisprudence has become encumbered by doctrinal
categories which, thoufflh based upon sound intuitions, now lack any underlying justifications. 1 1 Professor Robert Post, in particular, has argued
that the underlying intuitions are highly contextual, and that rather than
seek principles that are context-independent, the Court should formulate
princifles that explicitly describe the ways in which social context matters.10 Looking to the history and nature of government entities and
spaces describes one particular way in which context matters.
Part III.A describes Professor Post's theories and two contexts that
matter in this case: the social role of the space and the role of the entity
intervening in the space. Part 111.B applies this framework to libraries' decisions to filter, arguing that an analysis of the role of libraries and of the
features of the Internet suggests that library filtering should be unconstitutional. Part IIJ.C applies this framework to the federal government's decision to impose a filtering condition on federal funding. Here again, the
purpose of the Internet subsidy program and the role of the federal government in local libraries suggest that CIPA should be unconstitutional.

IOI. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249 (1995) [hereinafter Post, Recuperating]; Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001).
102. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 603 (I 990) [hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept]; Post, Recuperating, supra
note 10 I; Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, I 06 YALE L.J. 15 1 (1996) [hereinafter Post,
Subsidized Speech].
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A.

Forums, Funding, and the First Amendment
In the context of subsidized speech, 103 Professor Post has posited two
contextual distinctions to separate government restrictions subject to strict
scrutiny from those subject to a more lenient standard of review. 104 The
first distinction is between regulations of public discourse and regulations
in the managerial domain; the latter describes those regulations that affect
speech as only a means to some legitimate government end. 105 For example, a school's decision to favor some papers over others (with better
grades) is best seen as a means to achieve educational goals and not a restriction on students' speech; such a decision is subject to a lenient standard of review. 106 The second distinction is between regulations that constrain private conduct and regulations that provide internal directives to
government agencies.107 Hence, the decision to dedicate the Kennedy Center to performing arts, rather than political speech, receives deference as
an internal directive, while a decision to dedicate the second-class mailing
rate to only some kinds of magazines would receive scrutiny as a constraint on private conduct. 108
Applying these distinctions requires two normative characterizations:
first, a characterization of the regulated speech, to determine whether it is
within or outside public discourse; and second, a characterization of the
government action, to determine whether it is directed internally or externally .109 Professor Post recognizes that these characterizations must in tum
depend on other factors, and he cites both Professor Seth Kreimer's baselines110 and Professor Kathleen Sullivan's distribution of rights 111 asappropriate factors. 112
I 03. Subsidized speech refers to expressive activities for which the government provides funds. When the government attaches conditions to the speech it subsidizes, this
raises line-drawing issues that are analytically similar to the other issues considered here.
See supra note 8.
104. See Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 102; see also Matthew Thomas Kline,
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, Note, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 347 (1999) (applying Post's framework to the Loudoun court's
decision).
105. Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 102, at 164.
106. Id. at 166.
107. /datl76.
l 08. Id. at 178-79.
109. Id. at 119.
110. See Seth F. Kreimer, A/locational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in
a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984) (describing the use of history, equality,
and predictions about the future as baselines to determine whether government regulations are penalties or subsidies).
111. See Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
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This Note suggests a somewhat different method of characterization,
one that focuses on relevant institutions. 113 The idea is that institutions
have histories and social roles, and that these histories and roles can be
used to constrain judicial characterizations. In particular, characterization
of the regulated speech should depend on a characterization of the space in
which the speech resides, and characterization of the government action
should depend on a characterization of the government actor. In analyzing
the space, courts should consider its compatibility with and openness to
speech, while in analyzing the government actor, courts should consider
the level and type of discretion entrusted to it. These analyses will incorporate the history of these institutions and the ways in which they interact
with other institutions. These histories and interactions provide a foundation for courts to apply First Amendment doctrine, dictating whether it is
appropriate to invoke public forum doctrine, editorial discretion, or the
selecti on-removal distinction. By referring to such evidence about social
roles, courts can avoid the potential circularity or groundlessness of assertions based solely in doctrine- assertions that strike many as reflecting
nothing more than personal opinions about the merits of the case at hand.
Characterizations of the space regulated and the actor regulating appear throughout the Court's First Amendment cases, but the Court rarely
highlights the importance of such considerations to the result they reach.
Velazquez demonstrates the need for the characterization of the §overnment space to be consistent with the roles of related institutions. 11 There
the Court held that to prevent legal aid attorneys from challenging welfare
laws was to distort the "usual functioning" of a medium of expression. 115
To determine the " usual functioning," the Court must have looked to
something other than the government legal aid program in question. Indeed, the Court noted that the legal aid program used "the State and Federal courts and the independent bar on which those courts depend" in order
to accomplish the program's goals. 11 6 Having established a program that
was integrated into the legal system as a whole, Congress could not regulate the program in ways that were inconsistent with the features of the
( 1989) (suggesting that courts should consider the effect of regulations on three types of
distributions of rights: between the public and private realms, among rightholders, and
among those with varying dependency on government benefits).
11 2. Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note I 02, at 179-80.
11 3. See also Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,
112 H ARV. L. R.Ev. 84 (1998) (arguing that courts should develop institution-specific
First Amendment doctrines).
114. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
115. Id. at 543.
116. Id. at 544.
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American legal system: in this case, with the autonomy given to lawyers
to advance all reasonable arguments on behalf of their clients.117
The Velazquez Court also noted the application of this principle to
public forum and editorial discretion cases, citing Rosenberger and
Forbes. 11 8 In Rosenberger, the Court held that a fund for university student newspapers created a limited public forum, from which the university
could not exclude religious publications.11 9 The Velazquez Court noted as
important to this result "the fact that student newspapers expressed many
different points of view." 120 This claim presumably reflects not an empirical fact, but rather a characterization of the space the university tried to
regulate. Similar considerations can also inform the decision to reject public forum principles and instead follow cases such as Forbes and Finley,
granting broad editorial discretion to government entities. Thus, the Velazquez Court referred to the result in Forbes as being based in "the dynamics of the broadcasting system." 12 1
Finley provides an example in which the characterization of the government actor mattered to the Court. In Finley, the Court held that because
the NEA already had discretion to evaluate proposals according to standards of "artistic excellence," it also had the discretion to consider the generic criteria of "decencl and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the American public." 12 Similarly, in Pico, the Court took into consideration the wide discretion granted to school boards. 123
Discretion in one area, however, does not imply discretion in every
area. Courts should analyze the nature of the discretion carefully to determine whether it applies in new settings. Thus, in Pico, despite recognizing
the right of school boards "to establish and apply their curriculum in such
a way as to transmit community values," 124 the plurality held that school
libraries were different because, as libraries, they were places for inde117. Justice Rehnquist appears to have a different interpretation of Velazquez,
namely, that the case stands for the proposition that the government may not restrict what
is inherently speech pitted against the government. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003).
Such a reading, while not entirely consistent with the language quoted above, does fit into
the framework developed here. Justice Rehnquist focuses not on the space, but on the
actor, reasoning that it is inconsistent to characterize the government as having the discretion to restrict challenges to itself.
118. Velazquez, 53 1 U.S. at 543 .
119. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 8 19 (1995).
120. Velazquez, 53 1 U.S. at 543 .
121. Id.
122. Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584 (1998).
123. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863 ( 1982).
124. Id. at 864.
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The Role ofLibraries

The plurality in ALA II focused on reconciling the result in the case
with the deference given to library book selection policies. 134 The trouble
with this approach is that deference is consistent with two different views
of the role of the library, and this approach does not provide a principled
way to choose between them. On the one hand, society might defer to library collection judgments because it is the role of libraries to guide society's morals; on the other hand, courts might defer to such judgments simply because it is too difficult for them to separate proper from improper
motives in the making of such judgments. 135
The history of libraries suggests that while in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries librarians may have been expected to provide moral
guidance to patrons, deference to librarians today is rooted mainly in pro136
cedural concerns. Where librarians were once information gatekeepers,
they are now information managers. Modern librarians see their role as
helping patrons to find the most appropriate material for their needs. 137
The modern rise of schools of "information management," to replace
schools of "library science," reflects this change. 138 The writings of librarians themselves also points to a changed role. Noticeably the quotation
cited by the jglurality that most suggests a moral purpose for libraries dates
from 1930. 1 9 The American Library Association's current position is that
"library materials 'should not be proscribed or removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval. "' 140
The plurality's characterization of libraries seems inconsistent with the
role the public expects libraries to play, namely that of providing access to
information. The plurality characterized libraries as having "broad discretion," and suggested that public libraries have an editorial role analogous

134. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
135. See id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. See Gregory K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment
Implications of the Use ofSoftware Filters to Control Access to Internet Pornography in
Public Libraries, 51 DRAKE L.REV. 213, 219-34 (2003).
137. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21.
138. See Katherine S. Mangan, In Revamped Library Schools, Information Trumps
Books, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2000, at A43; Kate Murphy, Moving From the
Card Catalogue to the Internet, N.Y. TIM ES, Jan. 6, 1997, at D5.
139. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304 (quoting F. Drury, Book Selection at xi ( 1930) ("It is
the aim of the selector to give the public, not everything it wants, but the best that it will
read or use to advantage.")).
140. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (quoting the American Library Association' s
("ALA") Library Bill of Rights, which the ALA adopted in 1948).
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In other contexts, however, selection and removal might not amount to the
same thing. In particular, in the context of libraries, selection and removal
decisions differ in the types of resource constraints faced and in the ability
of courts to detect improper motives. 132 These contextual differences may
mean that the discretion to select does not imply the discretion to remove.
Thus, whether a restriction on a government space is a regulation of a
limited public forum or an exercise of editorial discretion depends on the
features and openness of the space and the discretion of the entity restricting the space. These, in turn, depend on whether restrictions and discretion
are consistent with the histories and interactions of the relevant institutions. In applying these principles to CIPA, it is important to distinguish
between the two different spaces and two different government entities at
issue in the case. To determine whether libraries can constitutionally filter
Internet content, we consider the discretion granted to libraries and the nature of library Internet access. To determine whether Congress can constitutionally require library filtering, we consider the discretion granted to
Congress vis-a-vis libraries and the nature of federal subsidy programs for
library Internet access. Each will be analyzed in turn.
B.

The Constitutionality of Library Filtering

The framework developed above suggests that to determine the constitutionality of library filtering, courts should analyze the social role of libraries and of library Internet access. History provides a particularly useful window on the former, and the characteristics of the Internet as a
whole inform our determination of the latter. Both the modem evolution of
librarians from gatekeepers to information managers and the open and
interactive nature of the Internet suggest that public forum doctrines apply,
rather than editorial discretion cases, and that there is reason to label filtering decisions as removal decisions. 133

132. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2321 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); Loudoun I, 2
F. Supp. 2d 783, 793 (E.D. Va. 1998).
133. Despite the opinions of Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Stevens, this case cannot
tum on the unblocking provisions and prior restraint doctrine. On the one hand, Lamont
holds that individuals cannot be required to affirmatively request access to protected
speech, and therefore suggests that patrons should not be required to request unblocking
of pages they have a right to see. See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 486-89 (E.D. Pa.
2002). On the other hand, almost any exercise of editorial discretion functions as a prior
restraint as to those materials not selected, but courts have never viewed this as a problem.

2004]

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS'N

1.

575

The Role ofLibraries

The plurality in ALA II focused on reconciling the result in the case
with the deference given to library book selection policies.134 The trouble
with this approach is that deference is consistent with two different views
of the role of the library, and this approach does not provide a principled
way to choose between them. On the one hand, society might defer to library collection judgments because it is the role of libraries to guide society's morals; on the other hand, courts might defer to such judgments simply because it is too difficult for them to separate proper from improper
motives in the making of such judgments. 135
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twentieth centuries librarians may have been expected to provide moral
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they are now information managers. Modem librarians see their role as
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cited by the jglurality that most suggests a moral purpose for libraries dates
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from 1930. The American Library Association's current position is that
"library materials 'should not be proscribed or removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval. "' 140
The plurality's characterization of libraries seems inconsistent with the
role the public expects libraries to play, namely that of providing access to
information. The plurality characterized libraries as having "broad discretion," and suggested that public libraries have an editorial role analogous

134. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
135. See id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. See Gregory K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment
Implications of the Use of Software Filters to Control Access to Internet Pornography in
Public Libraries, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 213, 219-34 (2003).
137. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21.
138. See Katherine S. Mangan, In Revamped Library Schools, Information Trumps
Books, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2000, at A43; Kate Murphy, Moving From the
Card Catalogue to the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, I 997, at D5.
139. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304 (quoting F. Drury, Book Selection at xi (1930) ("It is
the aim of the selector to give the public, not everything it wants, but the best that it will
read or use to advantage.")).
140. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (quoting the American Library Association's
("ALA") Library Bill of Rights, which the ALA adopted in 1948).
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to that of public television stations. 141 However, while society needs librarians to make certain inevitably content-based judgments, it is not at all
clear that libraries have the sort of discretion that television stations have.
For example, suppose a public television station refused to broadcast programs on the abortion debate, whatever the viewpoint, claiming that such
programs are too controversial. Forbes suggests that such a decision
would be well within the discretion of the station, 142 and viewers would
probably accept both the decision and the explanation. Now suppose a
public library refused to acquire books about the abortion debate for the
same reason. This decision seems inconsistent with the library's role in
providing access to information in a way that the television station's
equivalent decision does not conflict with its more selective role.
Of course, the library might fail to acquire books about the abortion
debate in the course of filling its shelves with other books. This result
could be consistent with the library's role, since in the fac.e of limited resources, the library must choose to provide access to some materials over
others. The difference is that in making this type of decision, the library
makes a comparative judgment about the relative value of different material, while in refusing to collect books on certain topics, the library makes
an absolute value judgment. In focusing on the evaluation of individual
materials, rather than on collection decisions as a whole, the plurality
made a subtle and unwarranted shift from approving comparative judgments to approving absolute judgments. 143 Resource constraints make
comparative judgments necessary, since in order to fulfill the goal of providing access to information, libraries must develop their collections
within the applicable constraints in some systematic way. Absolute judgments are not consistent with this goal, however, since such judgments
deny access to some information without also providing access to other
information. 144

141. ALA I/, 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
142. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,682 (1998).
143. Compare ALA I/, 123 S. Ct. at 2304 ("[L]ibraries collect only those materials
deemed to have ' requisite and appropriate quality."') (quoting ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at
421), with ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 421 ("[L]ibrarians . . . build, develop and create collections that have certain characteristics, such as balance in its coverage and requisite and
appropriate quality.").
144. Of course, libraries can (and must) make absolute judgments in eliminating obscenity and child pornography, but the categorization of some speech as illegal is itself
the absolute judgment upon which the library bases its action. Cf Laughlin, supra note
136, at 264-65 (arguing that librarians must make the sometimes hard decision about
whether specific material is obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors).
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Thus, the real distinction in the context of libraries is not between selection decisions and removal decisions, but between resource-constrained
failures to acquire, which involve comparative judgments, and refusals to
acquire and outright removals, which involve absolute judgments. 145
Viewed in this light, it does not matter whether we characterize the blocking of a Web page as a failure to acquire the page or a removal of the
page. In either case, the filter makes an absolute judgment about the
page's value (or lack thereof). Even if libraries face a resource constraint
in allocating time on Internet-accessible computers, 146 this constraint does
not justify such absolute judgments. A library's decision about how best to
fill its patrons' time on the Internet is different from its decision about
how best to fill its book shelves. The latter is in furtherance of its goal of
providing information to its patrons, while the former puts the library back
in its now disclaimed position as arbiter of society's morals. 147

2.

The Characteristics ofthe Internet

The difference in the type of resource constraints faced provides at
least one reason why library book collection policies and Internet filtering
policies need not be treated alike under the First Amendment. Indeed, the
Court has cautioned repeatedly that different media have different characteristics, leading to different results for First Amendment purposes. 148 It is
important to consider how the features of the Internet determine the possibilities for the characterization of library Internet access.
In discussions about library filtering, courts often conceive of the
Internet as the world's master library, a storehouse of information from
which either libraries or patrons can choose. 149 Under this view, Web pub145. The argument here is that this distinction separates judgments that are consistent
with the library' s role from those that are not. Whether the distinction is judicially manageable is a separate issue. Considerations ofjudicial manageability may support drawing
the line between selection and removal in the context of book collections.
146. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
147. See Peltz, supra note 18, at 465 ("Librarianship, after all, is about helping people access and sift information and ideas; librarianship, ideally, is not about deciding
what information people may access and what they may not.").
148. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 n.3 ('" We are wary of the notion that a partial
analogy in one context, for which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range
of decisions in such a new and changing area."') (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996)). Compare FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 ( 1978) (upholding regulation of indecent radio broadcast), with
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (striking down regulation of indecent dial-a-porn).
149. See, e.g. , ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 ("[The Internet] is 'no more than a technological extension of the book stack."') (quoting S. REP. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999)); Lou-
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lishers, and their First Amendment interests, lie outside the library. This
view, however, minimizes one of the greatest assets of the Internet: its interactive nature. In a library's book stacks, the line between speaker and
listener is clear, but on the Internet, the line becomes blurred. Publication
on the Internet is relatively cheap and easy, so that library patrons now
have the ability to add to the "library" themselves by setting up their own
Web pages, which can then be accessed by other patrons and everyone
else. The recent rise in blogging, the creation of online journals, is expanding the universe of Internet authors even more.150
More importantly, much of the Internet is designed to integrate the
speech of many different participants so that each is simultaneously
speaker and listener. Personal Web pages invite visitors to comment in
guestbooks, which other visitors can then read. Auction sites invite buyers
and sellers to post feedback, which is then read by other potential buyers
and sellers. Online forums provide places where communities can gather
to discuss issues; in such a setting, it is hard to imagine a line between authors and readers. The existence and proliferation of online forums particularly suggests that even as an information gathering tool, the Internet is
different from a· book collection. By allowing individuals to ask and answer questions and to post running commentary, online forums invite users to participate more actively in the process of finding information (by
asking questions), and to contribute more directly to the store of information (by answering questions or posting comments).
All of this suggests that even if library Internet access is not a "public
forum for Web publishers to express themselves," 151 at least when "Web
publishers" refers to people outside the library, it may well be a public forum for library patrons to express themselves. 152 When the library filters
out personal Web pages or (the aptly named) online forums, it restricts not
only its patrons' ability to access information, but also their ability to provide information and to participate in discussions. 153
doun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("The Internet therefore more closely

resembles plaintiffs' analogy of a collection of encyclopedias from which defendants
have laboriously redacted portions deemed unfit for library patrons.").
150. See Pamela LiCalzi O'Connell, Online Diary: Blog Bog, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2003, at G3 (citing a study predicting 5.86 million active biogs in 2004).
151. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2305.
152. See Bell, supra note 64, at 207 (suggesting that for the receipt of information,
libraries are at least limited public forums, and are perhaps even traditional public forums); Peltz, supra note 18, at 463 (same).
153. It makes no difference that the library provides only the conduit and not the
space on which the speech resides. We would never allow the post office to filter mail
under the theory that it is merely a conduit for the speech and that private alternatives
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Libraries might assert that the interactive features of the Internet are
beyond the scope of what they intend to provide their patrons. Indeed,
some libraries restrict or prohibit the use of Internet access for email, chat
groups, or online games, and man{4 such restrictions may be constitutional
1 4
because they are content-neutral. Other libraries might provide access to
online databases through an Internet connection, but not provide general
155
Internet access. A library cannot, however, provide general Internet access and then claim that it does not intend for its patrons to speak. It cannot claim that it intends for its patrons to retrieve information from the
Internet, but not to post to online forums. Such distinctions are not consistent with the nature and functioning of the Internet; 156 on the Internet,
posting to online forums is an integral part of information retrieval.
Thus, regardless of how a library might characterize its intent, library
Internet access is, at least in part, a forum for its patrons' speech. Because
this speech is integral to the public discourse on the Internet as a whole,
this forum constitutes a limited public forum, and restrictions on it should
157
be subject to strict scrutiny. Where government venues intersect with
existing media, the characteristics of the media matter, and the government is not free to define its venues in any way it sees fit.
C.

The Constitutionality of Congress' Funding Condition

The framework developed in Part III.A can also be used to address the
question of whether CIPA might be unconstitutional even if library filtering were constitutional. The focus of the inquiry, however, is different.
We are no longer concerned with the role of libraries as regulators of the
Internet, but rather with their role as targets of federal regulation. In both
cases, courts should consider the institutional role of libraries, but they
should be asking different questions, because in the one case, the library is
the government entity, and in the other case, the library is a participant in
the government space. Clearly delineating between these two views of libraries is crucial to avoiding a strange irony of the plurality opinion. That
opinion celebrates the role of libraries in making independent editorial
judgments in order to demonstrate the constitutionality of a federal program that constrains those judgments.
exist to accomplish the same result.
154. See Laughlin, supra note 136, at 260.
155. See Peltz, supra note 18, at 402-03.
156. See supra note 11 5 and accompanying text.
157. Mandatory library filtering for adults cannot pass strict scrutiny, since there are
many less restrictive alternatives that serve the government's interests. See ALA I, 201 F.
Supp. 2d 401 , 471-84 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also Peltz, supra note 18, at 466-68 (arguing
that even if filtering were the least restrictive means, it would not be narrowly drawn).
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To begin to untwist the logic, recall that if library filtering is itself unconstitutional, then CIPA is also unconstitutional. Hence, for the purposes
of this section, we will assume that library filtering is constitutional. Althou~h there are multiple ways the Court could have reached this finding, 1 8 the most likely route, and the one the Court actually used, involves
first determining that libraries have a broad discretion that encompasses
the decision to filter Internet access. If libraries do have such broad discretion, however, they must also have some form of First Amendment rights,
and the Court should have held that CIPA unconstitutionally conditions
159
funding on the surrender of these rights.
First, if libraries have sufficient editorial discretion to decide whether
or not to filter Internet access, that discretion should be protected under
the First Amendment. In Forbes, the Court held that " [w]hen a public
broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation
of its programming, it engages in speech activity." 160 If a library has simi161
lar discretion in its selection decisions, as the plurality found, then it
should follow that the library's selection decisions are also a form of
speech activity. Likewise, the Court has held that the "editorial control and
judgment" that a newspaper exercises in deciding what to print is a form
of speech protected by the First Amendment. 162 Any editorial judgment
that the library exercises over what to provide its patrons should be similarly protected.
Furthermore, if the library's decisionmaking can be properly analogized to that of a newspaper, Rosenberger should have guided the Court in
ALA //. 163 In Rosenberger, the Court held that a university fund to subsidize student newspapers was a limited public forum, and that therefore,
164
the university could not refuse to subsidize religious publications.
Viewed differently, the Court essentially struck down the university's re158. For example, the Court could have applied strict scrutiny, but then determined
that library filtering passes strict scrutiny.
159. See also R. Polle Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV.
755, 802-04 (1999) (arguing that libraries' editorial rights have First Amendment status
and that under "current unconstitutional conditions doctrine," the Court would be
unlikely to allow Congress to require filters on library computers purchased with nonfederal funds).
160. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
l 6 l. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (2003).
162. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a
newspaper could not be compelled to print a political candidate's reply to an attack previously printed in the newspaper).
163. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
l 64. Id. at 834-37.

2004]

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS'N

581

quirement that funding recipients not publish religious content. The federal subsidy programs constrained by CIPA, like the university subsidy
program at issue in Rosenberger, provides funds with which individual
libraries can determine what content to make available to their patrons,
much as the student newspapers determined what content to make avail165
able to their readers.
In both cases, the funding programs established
limited public forums, and courts should subject to strict scrutiny any restrictions on the content that funding recipients can make available. The
government should not be allowed to condition access to a limited public
forum on the surrender of editorial discretion.
The plurality asserted that Rosenberger was inapplicable because,
once again, "public libraries do not install Internet terminals to provide a
forum for Web publishers to express themselves." 166 This claim, besides
being suspect for the reasons noted above, 167 confuses the role of libraries
as regulators with the role of libraries as targets of regulation. In analyzing
the constitutionality of CIPA under the assumption that library filtering is
constitutional, the question is not how to characterize a library's decision
to install Internet terminals, but how to characterize Congress' decision to
subsidize Internet access. It is the latter question that sheds light on the
relevant issue of whether the federal subsidy programs established a limited public forum. 168 Congress has made it clear that the goal of federal
subsidies for library Internet access is to expand public access to the resources available on the Internet, and to help bridge the digital divide. 169
Such programs are thus designed to facilitate private speech and encourage public discourse, key attributes of limited public forums.
The plurality's argument that CIPA should be viewed as merely
bounding the scope of the federal programs 170 is inconsistent with the respective roles of the federal government and of local libraries. To the extent that libraries make editorial judgments, constraints on these judgments
are not consistent with the federal government's social role, and thus
should be seen as external to federal subsidy programs, not an integral part
165. See id.
166. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2309 n.7.
167. See supra Part IIl.8.2.
168. Indeed, by assuming that library filtering is constitutional, we are essentially
assuming that library Internet access is not a limited public forum. See supra note 157
and accompanying text.
169. See 20 U.S.C. § 9121 (2000); see also ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 , 411-12 (E.D.
Pa. 2002); Steven D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet
Protection Act and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, 80 W ASH. U. L.Q. 1025, I 025-27 (2002).
170. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2307-08.

582

BERKELEYTECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 19:555

of defining the programs' scope. 17 1 Considering a hypothetical statute will
help clarify this point. Suppose Congress established a subsidy program to
allow libraries to purchase newspapers, but then required all funded libraries to exclude newspapers that print comics. 172 Such a requirement might
be perfectly rational, but one imagines that courts would see this as an intrusion upon libraries' discretion to choose newspaper subscriptions. If
Congress' decision to condition funding on the content provided through
library newspapers should be subject to strict scrutiny, so should its decision to condition funding on the content provided through library Internet
access. 173 In both cases, restrictions should be suspect because Congressional discretion is inconsistent with the role of the federal government in
local libraries.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In order to determine the constitutionality of regulations on government spaces, courts must draw lines between spaces for public discourse
and spaces for government speech, and between constraints on government and constraints on private speakers. This line drawing involves inevitably normative judgments, but an analysis of institutions can expose
these judgments for further debate and should constrain them. The social
roles of relevant spaces and relevant government entities limits the plausible characterizations that a court might give to the speech and the regulation at issue. An understanding of the roles of libraries, of Internet access,
and of the federal government suggests that library filtering is unconstitutional and that such filtering cannot be a constitutional condition of federal
funding, contrary to the result in ALA II.
The need for institutional analysis is particularly keen in the context of
regulation of the Internet. Appeals to precedent invite courts to minimize
the differences between new media and old. The Internet becomes nothing
more than a very large library, or perhaps a very comprehensive encyclo-

171. See Bell, supra note 64, at 231 (suggesting that courts should prefer to insulate
library professionals from political pressure).
172. That is, if a library took any funds, it could not subscribe to any such newspapers, using these or other funds.
173. One might argue that the restriction on Internet access is for a more compelling
reason than the restriction on newspapers, but this is relevant only to the application of
strict scrutiny, not the decision to apply strict scrutiny in the first place. Whether the federal funding condition can pass strict scrutiny essentially depends on whether library filtering would pass strict scrutiny, since any means less restrictive than filtering would also
provide a less restrictive funding condition. See supra note 157.
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pedia. Courts must be careful to notice the differences, to discuss them,
and to consider the ways in which they matter. If courts fail to engage in
this analysis, at best, they may make rulings that are inconsistent with the
social roles of relevant institutions, and at worst, they risk undermining
these roles in hidden ways. As Professor Lawrence Lessig points out, the
Internet has no inherent nature, it is what we make of it. 175 The plurality in
ALA II crafts its holding under the assumption that the Internet is a oneway conduit of information subject to centralized control. If courts continue to uphold Internet regulation under the same assumption, this assumption may become reality. While the merits of such a shift are certainly open to debate, at the very least, courts and society should engage
the debate in an open and transparent manner. After all, that is what the
First Amendment is about.

174. See supra note 149.
175. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE 5-6 ( 1999).

